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Abstract 
This research reviews the role of corporate governance regarding transactions with related parties and company performance.  85 
companies admitted into the TSE were studies during a six months period between 2008 and 2013.  Transaction with related parties is a 
usual trait of commercial activities.  For example, some businesses conduct their activities via subsidiary businesses, particular partnerships 
and related businesses.  Transactions with related parties can affect financial situation, financial performance and flexibility of the business.  
In this research the ratio of non-executive members of the board of directors to total members, membership or non membership of the 
managing director in the board, size of board and shares of institutional owners have been used as corporate governance variables.  Finally, 
Eviews and Excel software and multi variable regression were used to test the research hypothesis.  Results indicate a signif icant correlation 
between transactions with related parties and returns on assets.  Results also showed that by importing corporate governance variables into 
the model, explanatory power of model increases and negative effect of transactions with related parties on performance reduces. 
Keywords: Related parties transactions, financial performance, corporate governance, returns on assets. 
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1 Introduction 
There are two theories regarding transaction 
with related parties each of which state different 
dimension of such transactions: 
 
1.1 Opportunist theory (Conflict of 
interests theory): 
 
      Considering theory of conflict of interests, 
sometimes the incentive for transactions with 
related parties is that company assets are taken 
out of company’s ownership for the benefit of 
related parties and manager commits to profit 
management to cover up.   
This theory is consistent with representation 
and states that such transactions are for personal 
benefits of managers and causes losses for 
shareholders and company.  However, managers 
distort financial statements to hide the adverse 
effects of these transactions (Jiong et al. 2010).  
 
1.2 Efficient behaviour theory (Efficient 
Transactions Theory). 
          This theory explains that sometimes for 
reaching experience, unique expertise or skill of 
related parties or compensation, transaction is 
conducted with them in which case, there is no 
motivation for profit management (Gordon & 
Henry, 2005). 
          Corporate governance system is created 
to provide possibility of control and balance 
between management and shareholders’ 
interests and consequently, reduction of 
representation contrast.                   Therefore, 
companies with better quality of governance 
system should face representation contrast less  
          Our objective is to review the role of 
corporate governance in transaction with related 
parties and company performance. 
 
Research theoretical basis: 
Definition of related party 
    According to standard 12 of accounting, 
related party: a related person is related to the 
business if and when: 
a. Directly or indirectly via one or several 
intermediates: 
1. Control the business, or is controlled by 
the business, or be under control of unit 
with it (including main businesses, sub 
businesses and sub businesses units 
groups), 
2. Has considerable influence in the 
business or, 
3. Controls the business. 
b. Business is related to that unit (according to 
standard 20 of accounting entitled 
“investment accounting in related 
businesses”), 
c. Be the particular partnership of that unit 
(according to standard 23 of accounting 
entitled “particular partnership 
accounting”), 
d. Be main manager of business or be the main 
business 
e. Be close relative of the said parties in clauses 
“a” or “d”, 
f.Controlled by said parties in clauses “d” or 
“e”, is jointly controlled by them or under their 
influence or a significant portion of their voting 
right is directly or indirectly at their disposal, 
g.Pension plan for business employees or 
pension plan for related parties employees and 
also businesses to be under the control of such 
schemes (Iran Accounting Standard, 2007). 
 
Transaction with related parties: 
     According to Iran’s accounting standard 
12, transaction with related party is defined thus: 
transfer of resources, services or commitments 
between related parties, regardless of demand or 
lack of demand of its value.  Ties with related 
parties can influence financial situation, financial 
performance and financial flexibility of the 
business.  Related parties may engage in 
transactions which non related parties don’t.  
The transaction sums between related parties 
may not be similar to sums in non related 
parties’ transactions.  For these reasons, 
knowledge of transactions, account balance of 
parties and relation with related parties, may 
influence financial statements’ users’ evaluation 
of business, including risks and opportunities of 
business (Iran Accounting Standards, 2007). 
 
Corporate governance system: 
     The oldest definition for corporate 
governance is taken from Latin “gubernance” 
which means guiding a vessel.  Definition of 
corporate governance is very wide.  In other 
words, we can divide this definition to limited 
view which limits definitions to relation between 
shareholders and company and wide definition 
which states the relation between company and 
other stakeholders including shareholders 
(Yahya Hassa Biganeh, 2005). 
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      Elson (2001), defined corporate governance 
via a view based on financial accounting and 
financial economy thusly: “corporate governance 
is a mechanism for solving representation issues.  
Therefore, coherent and strong corporate 
governance can positively affect profit quality, 
reduce incentives and opportunities of profit 
management and consequently accruals and 
enhance profit sustainability.   
 
Corporate governance mechanism: 
Ratio of non-bound members of board 
(composition of board of directors):   
composition of the board (a criteria for their 
independence) as a control tool in company, 
determines the power of the board.  Thus, 
composition of the board is an important 
explanatory factor for members’ ability to carry 
out their tasks and help company performance. 
a. Size of board of directors: size of board of 
directors (members) is an important feature in 
characteristics of the board of directors.  
Smaller board of directors has less 
bureaucracy and their insight of financial 
reporting is probably better. 
b. Duality of the CEO’s responsibilities: CEO’s 
responsibilities include organising and 
conducting meetings of the board.  In many 
countries a CEO also acts as the chairman of 
the board concurrently. 
c. Shares owned by institutional owners: 
shareholders and specially, institutional 
investors, play a vital role.  Institutional 
investors can supervise company 
management with their knowledge and 
sufficient experience in relevant expertise and 
finance and their influence on management 
can be the basis for aligning management 
interests with that of shareholders to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth and on the 
other hand, allow powerful shareholders’ 
access to confidential information and 
information asymmetry between powerful 
shareholders and others. 
 
2 Research background: 
          Rachdi et al. (2004) showed that there is a 
negative link between company performance 
and composition of role of board of directors and 
executive manager because separating their roles 
bears extra costs such as lack of coordination and 
weaker decision making which can affect 
company performance in a reversed way. 
          Gordon et al. (2004) in their research found 
that there is a link between transactions with 
related parties with weak corporate governance 
mechanism and low market returns. Lawrence & 
Caylor (2004, 2006)in their research on corporate 
governance and operational performance 
showed that companies with 15 to 16 members 
on their boards had higher dividends and 
enjoyed a higher net profit margin in comparison 
to other companies. 
 
          Akimova, I. & G. Schwodianer (2006) 
reviewed the effect of ownership structure on 
corporate governance and privatised 
institutions’ performance in the Ukraine and 
found that ownership has significant influence 
on performance. 
         
          Chien Chu-Yang et al. (2010) reviewed the 
role of related parties’ transactions in company 
performance and like other researchers, arrived 
at the negative relation of these two variables.  
They used accounting quality and non-executive 
managers as mechanism of corporate governance 
principles and concluded that these mechanisms 
can lead to positive relation between related 
parties’ transactions and company performance 
and reinforce value increase of these 
transactions. 
 
          Baseh et al. (2010) reviewed 1448 
companies between 1991-2008 to examine the 
link between “corporate governance and 
performance” and concluded that there is no 
significant correlation between the two. 
 
          Chen & Sou (2010) examined the link 
between related parties transactions and 
company performance and also, whether 
corporate governance positively influences the 
link between related parties transactions and 
company performance and used board of 
directors’ independent criterion to measure 
effect of corporate governance and assumed the 
effect of related parties’ transactions on company 
performance being affected by corporate 
governance mechanism.  They concluded that 
there is a negative link between related parties’ 
transactions and company performance.  Results 
showed that corporate governance mechanism 
changes these transactions from opportunistic to 
efficient deals and board of directors plays the 
moderator in these transactions.  
      
          Nikbakht & Rahmani Niya (2010) reviewed 
effect of board of directors’ characteristics 
including its size, ratio of non executive 
members in composition of board, number of 
board meetings and financial knowledge of 
members and separation of role of executive 
manager from chairman of board on company 
performance.  Results indicate that the board in 
Iran’s capital market has not carried out its tasks 
effectively to reduce representation issues and 
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has no significant effect on company 
performance. 
 
          Ebrahimi Kurdlur et al. (2010) reviewed the 
effect of institutional ownership type on 
company performance.  To measure company 
performance, three indexes (Tobin’s Q, asset 
returns and net profit margin) were employed.  
Results indicated a positive link between 
institutional ownership and company 
performance.  Also, correlation between various 
existing institutional investors in company 
ownership structure and their performance was 
reviewed by dividing institutional owners into 
active and passive groups.  Findings indicate a 
positive correlation between both groups (active 
& passive) and company performance so it 
cannot be claimed that activity or passivity of 
institutions affects their supervisory role. 
       
          Zaraee et al. (2012)reviewed the correlation 
between related parties’ transactions and 
company performance with emphasis on 
corporate governance variables.  Ratio of non 
executive members of board to total members 
and membership or non-membership of 
chairman in board was used as corporate 
governance variables.  Results indicated that 
there is a significant correlation between related 
parties’ transactions and asset returns.  Also, by 
including corporate governance variables into 
the model, explanatory power of model 
increased and negative effect of related parties’ 
transactions on performance was reduced.  
  
Research hypothesis: 
        H1: there is a significant correlation between 
related parties’ transactions and performance. 
 H2: corporate governance index effects the 
relation between related parties’ transactions and 
company performance. 
 
Methodology: 
      This research is applied in terms of target 
and is descriptive and correlated in essence.  For 
analysis of data, the multi linear regression 
model with panel data and random effects was 
use.  To determine the significance of regression, 
F statistic was employed. 
 
Statistical sample and community:  
      Statistical community included companies 
admitted into the TSE between 2008 and 2013.  
Method used for sampling was systematic 
elimination namely, that companies in the 
statistical community were selected with 
consideration of below conditions: 
1. Be present in the TSE during the period of 
research and their shares are dealt in during 
the same period. 
2. Their financial year is not altered during the 
research period. 
3. Have transactions with related parties 
during research period. 
4. Not to be part of investment and financial 
intermediation companies. 
 
      85 companies were identified according to 
above criteria.  The required data was then 
gathered from information bank at the Tehran 
Stock Exchange, RahAvard Novin and 
TadbirPardaz software and TSE publications for 
the research.  Analysis of data was conducted 
using EViews and Excel software.   
 
Research variables: 
Independent variables 
          RPT: related parties’ transactions; 
considering that information relating to number 
of transactions, buying and selling with related 
parties are not revealed by companies accepted 
into the Tehran Stock Exchange, Rial value of 
transactions with related parties is used to assess 
related parties’ transactions.  Some researchers 
have recently used total amount earned from 
related parties’ transactions as an index for 
assessing related parties’ transactions (Gordon, 
2004; Kohlick and Meyhugh, 2005).  However, 
this criterion will be based on one of the concepts 
likes book value of assets during homogenisation 
period or that natural logarithm of related 
parties’ transactions’ Rial value will be used. 
Corporate governance mechanism are as 
follow: 
1. Ratio of non-executive members of board: 
for annual corporate observation-companies 
with higher number of non-executive 
members to 50%, have a value of 1 and the 
rest of observations with a value of 0. 
2. Shares of institutional owners: for annual 
corporate observations-company with 3 
institutional shareholders with total share 
above 50%, the same number and for other 
observations, value 0 is considered. 
3. Size of board of directors: if the number of 
board members in corporative annual 
observations-is over 5, it has a value of 1 
otherwise, value 0 is given. 
4. Duality of managing director’s 
responsibilities: if in corporate annual 
observation managing director is CEO, value 
of 1 and otherwise, value 0 is considered. 
 
Dependent variable 
        ROA: return on assets; ratio of operational 
profit after deduction of taxes to assets mean. 
Control variables:   
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Growth: of assets; ratio of total assets changes 
to total assets of previous period. 
Size: company size; natural logarithm of total 
assets.    
Age: company age; number of years of 
company activity since foundation to now. 
 
Statistical analysis and test of hypothesis: 
Results of H1 test: 
       Considering adjusted coefficient of 
determination obtained for this model which is 
60.1%, we can claim that independent and 
control variables explain over 60% of dependent 
variable changes in the research.  Also, 
considering the Watson-Durban statistic of this 
model which is 1.991, we can claim that first 
order autocorrelation does not exist among 
remains of model. 
Results of 2nd hypothesis test: 
Results of this test with institutional 
ownership criterion are in table (3). 
       Considering the adjusted coefficient of 
determination obtained for this model (64.6%), 
we can claim that control and independent 
variables explain over 64% of changes to 
dependent variable.  Also, considering Watson-
Durban statistic of this model (1.698), we can 
claim that first degree autocorrelation does not 
exist among remains of model. 
      Results of 2nd hypothesis with board size 
criterion are in table (4). 
Considering the adjusted coefficient of 
determination obtained for this model (62.5%), 
we can claim that control and independent 
variables of research explain over 62% of 
dependent variable changes.  Also, considering 
Watson-Durban statistic of this model (1.698), we 
can claim that first degree autocorrelation does 
not exist among remains of model. 
      Results of 2nd hypothesis with non-executive 
members’ ratio criterion are in table (5). 
Considering the adjusted coefficient of 
determination obtained for this model (65.6%), 
we can claim that control and independent 
variables of research (65%) explain the changes 
to dependent variable.  Also, considering 
Watson-Durban statistic of this model (1.698), we 
can claim that first degree autocorrelation does 
not exist among remains of model. 
      Considering the adjusted coefficient of 
determination obtained for this model (64%), we 
can claim that control and independent variables 
of research (64%) explain the changes to 
dependent variable.  Also, considering Watson-
Durban statistic of this model (1.847), we can 
claim that first degree autocorrelation does not 
exist among remains of model. 
          Result of table (7) presented the result 
reflect impact of the standard of corporate 
governance, related party transactions and the 
relationship between the performance companies 
listed on the stock exchange.  
tables and equations: 
 
Research model: 
The below model is recommended for test of 
first hypothesis: 
 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,t +β2 GROW i,t  + β3 SIZE i,t + 
β4Agei,t +ɛ i,t  
(1)   
Below model is also recommended for test of 
second hypothesis: 
 
 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,,+ β2CGi,t + β3RPTi,t 
*CGi,t+β4 GROW i,t    + β5 SIZE i,t + β6 Agei,t +ɛ  i,                                                                                                 
     
                                                                                                     (2) 
.
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of research variables 
 
Variables Mean Median Max. Min. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Return on assets ..1.4 ....0 ...3 -0.313 0.114 
Related parties’  11.04. 11.487 1...71 3.0177 0..138 
Business Size 5.7.. 5.744 ...17 4.0.1 ...70 
Company growth ..14. ...71 3..80 -0.996 ..... 
Company age 35.31 38 5..... ...... 10.117 
NXRATIORPT ....7 11..50 1...71 ..... 4..31 
INSOWNRPT 7.437 1..837 1...71 ..... 5...3 
DUALITYRPT 0.543 ..... 15.5 ..... 4.871 
BSIZERPT 1.... ..... 17.0.7 ..... 3.337 
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Table (2): Results of research model estimation 
 
Research model ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,t +β2GROWi,t+ β3SIZEi,t+ β4Agei,t +ɛi,t 
      Variables Coefficients T Statistic Probability of error 
Intercept ..4.4 ..483 .....  
RPTs .....-  4.010-  ..... 
Business size ...5.-  5..77-  ..... 
Company age .....3 ..0.84 ..87. 
Business growth ...117 0.140 ...30 
Coefficient of 
determination 
...81 
Adjusted coefficient 
of determination 
....1 
F statistic ..8.. 
Probability of F 
statistic 
..... 
Durban-Watson 
statistic 
1...1 
 
 
Table 3: Results of research model estimation 
 
Research model 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,,+ β2INSOWNi,t + β3RPTi,t 
*INSOWNi,t+β4GROWi,t+ β5SIZEi,t+ β6Agei,t +ɛi,t 
                      Variables Coefficients T statistic Error Probability 
Intercept 0.392 5.227 0.000 
RPTs -0.012 -4.765 0.000 
Business size -0.047 -4.938 0.000 
Company age 0.000 ..030 ..718 
Business ....7 1.5.0 ..110 
Institutional ownership ....5 3.4.. ....1 
RPTs and institutional ownership ....5 0..44 ...40 
Coefficient of determination ..8.. 
Adjusted determination of coefficient ...4. 
F statistic 11.317 
Probability of F statistic ..... 
Durban-Watson statistic 1...7 
 
Table (4): Results of research model estimation 
 
Research Model 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,,+ β2BSIZEi,t + β3RPTi,t *BSIZEi,t+β4GROWi,t+ β5SIZEi,t+ 
β6Agei,t +ɛi,t 
                                 Variables Coefficients T Statistic Error Probability 
Intercept 0.457 6.12 0.000 
RPTs -0.009 -4.099 0.000 
Business size -0.046 -4.75 0.000 
Company age 0.000 0.248 0.805 
Business growth 0.011 2.115 0.035 
Board of directors’ size 0.057 3.095 0.002 
RPTs and board of directors’ size 0.001 0.529 0.597 
Coefficient of determination 0.691 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.625 
F statistic 10.413 
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Probability of F statistic ..... 
Durban-Watson statistic 1..4. 
Table (5): Results of research model estimation  
Research Model 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,,+ β2NXRATIOi,t + β3RPTi,t 
*NXRATIOi,t+β4GROWi,t+ β5SIZEi,t+ β6Agei,t +ɛi,t 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic Error Probability 
Intercept 0.411 5.574 ..... 
RPTs -0.011 -4.75 0.000 
Business size -0.047 -5.102 0.000 
Company age 0.001 0.448 0.654 
Business growth 0.01 2.005 0.046 
Ratio of non-executive members of board 0.043 2.5 0.013 
RPTs and Ratio of non-executive members of board 0.004 2.586 0.01 
Coefficient of determination 0.717 
Adjusted coefficient of determination 0.656 
F statistic 11.875 
Probability of F statistic ..... 
Durban-Watson statistic 1.800 
 
Table (6): Results of research model estimation  
Research model 
ROAi,t = β0 + β1RPTi,,+ β2DUALITYi,t + β3RPTi,t *DUALITYi,t+β4GROWi,t+ 
β5SIZEi,t+ β6Agei,t +ɛi,t 
                                         Variables Coefficients T Statistic Error Probability 
Intercept 0.475 6.555 0 
RPTs -0.008 -3.861 0.000 
Business size -0.049 -5.238 0.000 
Company age 0.000 -0.181 0.857 
Business growth 0.014 2.739 0.006 
Duality of managing director 0.038 2.158 0.032 
RPTs & duality of managing 
director 
0.004 2.223 0.027 
Coefficient of determination 0.708 
Adjusted coefficient of 
determination 
0.646 
F statistic 11.328 
Probability of F statistic ..... 
Durban-Watson statistic 1.748 
 
Table (7): Results of research model estimation 
Research model 
+ i,tSIZE5+ βi,tGROW4+βi,t*GCi,t RPT3+ β,i,RPT1+ β 0= β i,tROA  i,tROA
i,tɛ+ i,tAge6β 
Variables Coefficients T Statistic Error Probability 
Intercept ..417 ..337 ..... 
RPTs ...1.- 8.55.- 0.000 
Business size -0.043 -5.117 0.000 
Company age .....0- -0.215 0.829 
Business growth 0.012 2.537 0.011 
RPTs and Ratio of non-executive members of 
board 
....5 ..084 ..... 
RPTs & duality of managing director 0.005 ..17. ..... 
RPTs and institutional ownership ....8 5.... ..... 
RPTs and board of directors’ size ....3 3.814 ..... 
Coefficient of determination ..8.1 
Adjusted coefficient of determination ..8.7      
52 
 
Recebido: dia/mês/ano Aceito: dia/mês/ano 
Conclusion 
Results of H1 test: 
          Results of H1 test show the existence of 
a negative and significant correlation between 
related parties’ transactions and company 
performance.  Among control variables, business 
growth has significant and positive link with 
performance.  Company size variable has 
significant negative correlation with company 
performance.  Other control variables have 
significant link with company performance.  
Results of this research are in line with 
researches of Chen & Sou (2010), Choyang Chin 
et al. (2010) and Gordon et al. (2004). 
 
H2 results with institutional ownership 
criterion: 
        Results of H2 test with institutional 
ownership show institutional ownership’s 
significant positive effect on link between RPTs 
and performance and among control variables, 
company size has significant negative correlation 
with company performance.  Other control 
variables have no significant correlation with 
performance.  Results of this research are in line 
with Lawrence & Kilver (2006) and contradict 
results obtained by Akimwa & Skodianer (2006).  
H2 results with board size criterion:           
       H0 results with board of directors’ size 
criterion show that board of directors’ size 
variable has not significant effect on relation 
between related parties’ transactions and 
company performance.  Also, board of directors’ 
size variable coefficient is (0.056) and its error 
level (0.002), this indicates a significant positive 
correlation between board of directors and 
company performance.  Among control 
variables, business growth variable has 
significant positive correlation with 
performance.  Company size variable has 
significant negative link with company 
performance.  Other control variables have no 
significant correlation with company 
performance.  Results of this research are in line 
with Base et al. (2010) and Lawrence & Kilver 
(2006).  
   
H2 results with non-executive board members 
ratio criterion: 
      Results of H2 test with non-executive 
board members ratio criterion indicate non-
executive board members ratio variable has 
significant positive effect on relation between 
RPTs and company performance.  Also, non-
executive board members ratio variable 
coefficient is (0.043) and error level of (0.012), 
which means that there is significant positive 
correlation between non-executive members and 
performance.  Among control variables, 
company size variable has significant negative 
link with co. performance.  Other control 
variables have no significant link with company 
performance.  Results of this research are in line 
with results obtained by Chuyang Chin et al. 
(2010) and Rachedi et al. (2008). 
H0 results with managing director’s duality 
criterion:   
        H2 test results with this criterion show 
that this managing director’s duality variable has 
significant positive effect on link between related 
parties’ transactions and company performance.   
Also, duality variable coefficient is (0.032) and 
error level of (0.032), which indicates a 
significant positive correlation between 
managing director’s duality and company 
performance. Among control variables, company 
size variable has significant negative link with 
company performance.  Other control variables 
have no significant link with company 
performance.  Results of this research contradict 
those of Rachedi et al. (2004).   
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